The only possible place of original responsibility [for a subsequent involuntary act] is an acratic act. a conscious sin. (2004: 307; Attributionism is similar to the views of self-disclosure mentioned by Watson (see previous subsection) in that both focus on how the behavior of a responsible agent reveals interpersonal and morally significant characteristics of the agent. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that contemporary attributionist views are only interested in specifying the conditions of what Watson calls responsibility. In fact, assignionists generally assume that they impose conditions to hold officers accountable for Watson`s responsibility. (See previous subsection for the distinction between accountability and accountability.) Although it is common for a person to be morally and legally responsible for an action, the two states do not always agree. If the possession of free will requires the ability to act differently than one actually does, then it is quite easy to understand why free will has often been considered incompatible with causal determinism. One way to resolve this incompatibilistic concern is to focus on how the execution of a particular action should depend on an agent if he has the kind of free will required for moral responsibility. As indicated by the argument of influential consequence (Ginet 1966; van Inwagen 1983: 55-105; Wiggins, 1973), the truth of determinism seems to mean that an agent`s actions are not his fault, since they are the inevitable consequences of things over which the agent has no control. Here is an informal summary of this argument from Peter van Inwagen`s important book, An Essay on Free Will (1983): Pereboom asserts that there is no relevant difference between cases 1, 2 and 3, so our judgments about Plum`s liability in these three cases should be different. Moreover, the reason why Plum is not responsible in these cases seems to be that his behavior in each case is causally determined by forces beyond his control (Pereboom 2001: 116). But then we should conclude that Plum is not responsible in case 4 (since causal determinism is the defining characteristic of this case).

And since Prune in case 4 is just a normal human in a causally deterministic universe, the conclusion we draw about him should extend to all other normal people in causally deterministic universes. (For an important and related manipulation argument, see Mele`s “zygote argument” in Mele 1995, 2006b, and 2008.) Moral duties are obligations that we should follow, but are not legally bound to do. It is our moral responsibility to serve our parents, teachers, siblings and loved ones. A similar view is that individual moral culpability lies in individual character. That is, a person with the character of a murderer has no choice but to kill, but can still be punished, because it is right to punish those who have a bad temper. The manner in which his own character was determined is irrelevant from this point of view. Robert Cummins, for example, argues that people should not be judged by their individual actions, but by how those actions “reflect their character.” If character (however defined) is the dominant causal factor in determining one`s decisions, and one`s choices are morally wrong, then one should be held accountable for those decisions, regardless of genes and other similar factors. [7] [8] Patrick Hew argued that an artificial system can only be morally accountable if its rules of conduct and the mechanisms for providing those rules cannot be entirely provided by outsiders. He added that such systems represent a significant departure from the technologies and theory as they existed in 2014. An artificial system based on these technologies is not responsible for its behavior.

Moral responsibility is attributed to the people who created and programmed the system. [57] For example, one must obey the Constitution and pay taxes on time and honestly. It is also a legal obligation for citizens to be loyal to their country. Let`s look at some additional mandatory legal instances. Judging whether a person is morally responsible for their behavior, and holding others and ourselves accountable for the actions and consequences of actions, is a fundamental and familiar part of our moral practices and interpersonal relationships.